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Time-consistent decisions and rational expectation
equilibrium existence in DSGE models
By Minseong Kim
Under some initial conditions, it is shown that time con-
sistency requirements prevent rational expectation equilibrium
(REE) existence for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models induced by consumer heterogeneity, in contrast to
static models. However, one can consider REE-prohibiting
initial conditions as limits of other initial conditions. The
REE existence issue then is overcome by using a limit of
economies. This shows that significant care must be taken
of when dealing with rational expectation equilibria.
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I. Introduction
In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, satisfaction
of time consistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) is crucial, especially for a
rational expectation equilibrium (REE).
Without stochastic shocks, DSGE models are equivalent to multi-period
static models, except for the question of time consistency, which prohibits
some of possible equilibria in dual multi-period static models.
This paper intends to demonstrate that under some initial conditions,
there is no time-consistent REE in an unexpected way. There is surprise
1
2in that conventional dynamic model analysis (Stokey, Lucas and Prescott,
1989) suggests there should be no equilibrium existence issue. The resolution
to this ‘paradox’ is easily found: for an economy E0, if we instead take
limit E → E0, then there exists the limit of model-corresponding equilibria.
There is no problem utilizing this limit equilibrium instead. This limit
strategy evades the time consistency issue by taking the limit of economies
that do not have time consistency issues.
II. Time consistency issue
In fashion of a New Keynesian model (Woodford, 2003; Gal´ı, 2015), as-
sume that a central bank controls issuance of Bit, where i refers to each
consumer. When Bit > 0, consumer has government bonds, when Bit < 0,
consumer is indebted to the central bank. Bit is the only way consumers
can build up wealth or be indebted. As standard with many DSGE models,
an infinite-horizon economy is assumed.
Suppose that the central bank, for whatever reasons, decides to impose
Bit = 0, along with a right interest rate path for the implementation. That
is, central bank decides to run an economy as if there is no finance. While
the assumption is quite toxic, this is not expected to produce no equilibrium
by itself.
Now the specification of consumer i follows.
(1) max
{Cit,Bit,..}
Ui = max
{Cit,Bit,..}
∞∑
t=0
(βi)
tui(Cit, ..)
where Cit refers to consumption good, βi refers to time discount factor and
ui refers to a single-period utility function with U being time-discounted
utility function. It is assumed that generally, βi 6= βj . Let the budget
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constraint of each consumer be:
(2) PtCit + (1 + it)
−1Bit + .. ≤ Bi(t−1) + ..
where .. terms do not contain any of Cit and Bit. Pt refers to price level and
it is nominal interest rate set by central bank.
The following main equation may be derived from consumer optimization,
with the derivation provided in the appendix:
(3)
u′j(Cjt)
u′k(Ckt)
=
(1− γjk)
γjk
(
βk
βj
)t
Note that Equation (3) can be derived even when Bit and central bank do
not exist - see the appendix.
Suppose that economic conditions remain time-invariant. For example,
there is zero technology factor growth, there is no capital accumulation in
an economy as standard in a basic New Keynesian model (Woodford, 2003;
Gal´ı, 2015) and so on. As aforementioned, Bit = 0, and there are infinitely
many time periods. Then Equation (3) creates the time inconsistency issue
not found in a dual multi-period static model.
Since economic conditions remain same across periods and there is no ‘end’
in time, the left-hand side of Equation (3) should remain constant across
time. This is impossible when βk 6= βj.
A. Limit economy
Note that the ‘initial condition’ requirement for the time inconsistency
result is relatively strong. First, Bit = 0 was required. Second, other eco-
nomic conditions also are assumed to remain same across periods. An infi-
4nite horizon also plays a role - however, technically, the time inconsistency
result itself can be created even in a finite horizon circumstance.
If any of these conditions is not satisfied, then Equation (3) cannot be
asserted to generate the time consistency issue.
We may then choose to approach an economy with the time consistency
issue as a limit of neighboring economies that do have time-consistent equi-
libria. A limit of equilibria then can be asserted to be an equilibrium for a
limit economy (the economy with the time consistency issue) as well.
Therefore, in practical sense, an economy with the time consistency issue
may safely be treated as if it has an equilibrium. In case of the example
economy, even if fiscal authority does not actually exercise its power, its
potential power to reallocate Bit helps to entirely avoid theoretical issues.
III. Conclusion
The lesson is that there must be significant care that must be taken of
when dealing with rational expectation equilibria (REE). It is well-known
that not all REE are meaningful or learnable. (Evans and Honkapohja,
2001; Evans and McGough, 2018) The direction also goes from non-existence
as well - non-existence of REE has to be carefully considered.
For REE non-existence driven by a time consistency issue induced from
consumer heterogeneity, it is easy to construct nearby economies that do
not have time consistency issues, thereby evading the issue. In such a case,
it is not economics-wise meaningful to declare that there exists no REE.
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Derivation of the main equation
Set up a Lagrangian:
(A1) Uj +
∞∑
t=0
[
λjt
(
Bj(t−1) + ..−
[
PtCjt + (1 + it)
−1Bjt + ..
])]
Let us consider the first-order condition associated with Bjt. It goes:
(A2) λj(t+1) − λjt(1 + it)
−1 = 0
6thus
(A3)
λj(t+1)
λjt
=
1
1 + it
Consider the first-order condition associated with Cjt. It goes:
(A4) (βj)
tu′j(Cjt)− λjtPt = 0
thus
(A5) λjt =
(βj)
tu′j(Cjt)
Pt
Now pick two consumers j and k:
(A6)
λjt
λkt
=
(βj)
tu′j(Cjt)
(βk)tu
′
k(Ckt)
(A7)
u′j(Cjt)
u′k(Ckt)
=
(βk)
t
(βj)t
λjt
λkt
Because of Equation (A3),
(A8)
λjt
λkt
=
λj(t+1)
λk(t+1)
=
1− γjk
γjk
for some constant γjk. Therefore, we obtain Equation (3).
Other ways the main equation may be derived
Because the derivation of the main equation relied on existence of a central
bank bond Bit, we would prefer the derivation that reproduces Equation (3)
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without having to rely on existence of Bit. This can be done by re-adapting
the idea in Negishi (1960).
Negishi (1960) states that a candidate competitive equilibrium has to be
a solution of a social planner problem with the utility function that assigns
constant weights to the utility function of individual agent.
But here, we are looking at general DSGE models, so there are cases
when firms are not price-taking and et cetera. So can we generalize Negishi
(1960)? The answer is yes.
The proof in Negishi (1960) only requires that “feasible” utility vectors
form a convex set and equilibria to sit on the boundary of the set.
By a utility vector, it means U¯ = (U1, U2, ..), where subscript indices refer
to consumers/agents.
In original Negishi (1960), “feasible” is defined as resource-wise feasible.
But this does not need to be the case. If we can redefine the word “feasible”
- such as considering how firms behave to set price that would prevent
additional possible allocations - we may allow feasible utility vectors to form
a convex set, while equilibria sit on the boundary of the set.
In such a case, let Us be:
(B1) Us = γU1 + (1− γ)U2 +
n∑
j=3
νjU3
where γ and νj are constants, and n refers to the number of consumers. Let
some of sequential constraints for the obtained social planner problem at
each time t be of form:
(B2) C1t + C2t + ... ≤ ...
8where ... terms do not contain any of C1t and C2t, and rest of constraints do
not contain any of C1t and C2t.
Then we get Equation (3) as the result of first-order conditions. First-
order conditions say:
γU ′1(C1t)− λt = 0
(1− γ)U ′2(C2t)− λt = 0
where λt is the sum of Lagrange multipliers attached to constraints that
share the form of Equation (B2). We can rewrite the above equations as:
γ(β1)
tu′1(C1t) = λt
(1− γ)(β2)
tu′2(C2t) = λt
Thus:
γ(β1)
tu′1(C1t) = (1− γ)(β2)
tu′2(C2t)
which gives us Equation (3).
While the required form of constraints to derive Equation (3) seem strin-
gent, it actually is not. One way to see this is as follows. From an initially
competitive competition economy, we may change firms to be monopolis-
tically competitive. But in such cases, consumer profiles do not change.
Unless firms engage in price discrimination against consumers, derived con-
straints will follow the form of Equation (B2) or will not have C1t and C2t
terms.
